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A unified model of monetary policy and bank regulation is presented.  In accordance with
modern banking theory, banks not only intermediate loans and deposits but also provide a
financial service affecting aggregate output.  Optimal parameter settings for monetary and
regulatory policy are derived.  New results are that monetary policy affects the expected level as
well as the variance of output, bank regulation should change continually in response to the state
of the economy, and bank regulation and monetary policy should be tightly coordinated.  This
last result has important implications for the institutional arrangements for conducting regulatory
and monetary policy.1See Ferguson (2000) for a recent argument along these lines.
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I. Introduction
What is the proper relation between the conduct of monetary policy and the regulation of
the financial system?  That question is an important one and currently of special interest in the
European Community, which is wrestling with the issue of whether or not responsibility for the
regulation of European financial institutions should be delegated to the new European Central
Bank.  On the one hand, financial institutions constitute the “channels of monetary policy” so
often discussed in the literature on monetary policy.  It would seem natural for the central bank
of a country to have responsibility for regulation both to ensure that the structure of the financial
institutions was sound and to provide useful information for the conduct of monetary policy.
1  On
the other hand, there is concern that if the central bank has the responsibility for regulation, the
regulation will be carried out too much for the benefit of monetary policy and not enough for the
benefit of the financial system itself.  A difficulty in evaluating the competing arguments in this
debate is that there is no theoretical treatment that simultaneously analyzes both regulation and
monetary policy.  The large literature on the optimal choice of monetary policy instruments,
starting with Poole (1970), does not include regulatory policy in the analysis.  The even larger
literature on optimal regulation of financial institutions has the symmetric problem of not
including monetary policy in the analysis.
The present paper presents a unified analysis of optimal bank regulation and optimal
money stock control.  The approach is a generalization of Poole’s (1970) original study of the
optimal conduct of monetary policy, in which the central bank must decide how to respond to
shocks to the economy while having only limited information on the current state of the2
economy.  The model extends that line of analysis to include bank regulation as well as monetary
policy.
There are two innovations in the model.  One is the introduction of a financial service
provided by the banking system.  The financial service is tied to but not the same as the volume
of bank lending, and it directly affects the productivity of the output sector of the economy.  An
example of such a service is bank monitoring of its borrowers (Fama, 1985; Holmstrom and
Tirole, 1997).  The financial service provides a crucial link between real economic activity and
the financial sector that heretofore has been missing from most aggregate models.  The work of
Bernanke (1981, 1983) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990) suggests that such a link is
important for understanding the effects of money on the real economy.  The other innovation is
inclusion of a bank regulatory requirement, such as a reserve requirement or required bank
capital ratio, imposed on the banks by a bank regulator.  This requirement affects the money
multiplier; through that, it affects both the level and stability of the financial service and
therefore the level and stability of real output.  The trade-off facing the regulator is that a stricter
regulatory requirement reduces both the mean and variance of output.  The latter is desirable, but
the former is not.  The optimal choice of the regulatory requirement reflects these competing
effects.
Several interesting results emerge from the analysis.  Contrary to the usual rational
expectations result, monetary policy affects the expected level (“natural rate”) of real output. 
Bank regulatory policy should be reactive, that is, it should change continually to reflect current
economic conditions.  Optimal regulation therefore should not be a passive activity, setting the
regulatory requirement only infrequently.  The sign and magnitude of the reaction parameter
depends on all the structural parameters of the system, including the variances and covariances3
among the random disturbances.  Optimal monetary policy and bank regulation are
simultaneously determined, implying that there must be tight coordination between the central
bank and the regulator.  The obvious institutional arrangement for achieving this coordination is
to have a single agency conduct both monetary and regulatory policy.
II. The Model
The analysis is conducted in the framework of a log-linear, rational expectations IS-LM
model.  The model includes a supply side for aggregate output and a governmentally regulated
banking system that generates inside money through a standard money multiplier mechanism.
1.  Aggregate Demand for Output.
Aggregate output demand has no special importance in the analysis, so we confine
attention to the simplest possible model:
(1)
where Y is the log of output, R is the real interest rate, * is a random disturbance term, and the di
are positive constants.  Equation (1) is the IS equation.  All effects of consumption and
investment not arising from the interest rate, such as expectations of future income or of the
marginal productivity of capital, are included in the term d0.  To keep the analysis tractable, we
shall treat d0 as a constant, thus suppressing all dynamic elements of the economy’s behavior that
would arise from changes in household or firm expectations of the future.  In principle, the model
can be extended in a straightforward way to include these influences, but the analysis is difficult.
2. Aggregate Supply of Output.
The aggregate output is given by the indirect production function:4
where P
~ is the price level, P
~e is the expected price level, F
~ is a the quantity of the financial
service provided by banks, 2






~ captures, among other things, the level of technical progress (i.e., total factor
productivity).  Taking logs of the production function gives a standard rational expectations
supply function augmented to include the effect of the financial service:
(2)
where variables without tildes are the logarithms those with tildes.
The novel aspect of this aggregate production function and its corresponding aggregate
supply function is the presence of the financial service F.  Modern theories of financial
intermediation argue that banks and other financial intermediaries provide services beyond
simply intermediating deposits and loans (an activity that is nonetheless still important and
discussed momentarily).  Examples of such services include liquidity insurance (Bryant, 1980;
Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), information sharing to overcome adverse selection (Leland and
Pyle, 1977), monitoring (Diamond, 1984; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997), facilitation of risk
transfer (Allen and Santomero, 1997), and reduction of participation costs (Allen and Santomero,
1997).  To expand on one specific example, we could suppose that the only element of F is
monitoring, which Fama (1985) has argued is the essence of what banks really do.  Monitoring
prevents opportunistic behavior of the borrower during realization of the investment project
funded by the loan.  The possibility for opportunistic behavior arises because borrowing means
that the entrepreneur has only a partial financial interest in the project and so has an incentive to2McCallum (2000) has argued that omitting monetary aggregates from models of
monetary economics is harmless.  The analysis of this paper suggests otherwise, at least for some
kinds of questions.
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devote some of his energies to other things, thus reducing the expected profitability of the project
that has been financed.  Monitoring prevents or at least reduces such behavior and thus increases
the efficiency of the economy.  See Holmstrom and Tirole (1997).  This increase in efficiency
can be captured by letting total factor productivity depend on the amount of monitoring, as done
above.  We thus have a simple model of aggregate production (and so of aggregate supply) that
corresponds to the view of Bernanke (1981, 1983) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990) that
financial intermediaries affect the aggregate economy through channels other than the traditional
one of creating inside money.
3. Money Market.
Nominal money is defined as M1, the sum of private demand deposits and currency in the
hands of the non-bank public.  Consideration of broader aggregates is unnecessary, but attention
cannot be restricted solely to high powered (outside) money because the non-monetary services
intimately associated with the presence of inside money is essential to the analysis.
2  Real money
demand is the usual
(3)
where M is the log of real M1, " is a random disturbance, and the ai are positive constants.  Real
money supply is determined by real high powered money and the money multiplier:
(4)
where m is the log of the money multiplier and H is the log of nominal high powered money. 
High powered money is determined by the central bank according to its monetary policy function3As usual, it is the unlogged value of the interest rate that enters (6) because what really
enters is log(1+R) which is approximately equal to R for small values of R.
4There actually are several capital/asset ratios varying in the assets considered and the
risk adjustment applied to them.  That complication is ignored here.
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(5)
where 0 is a random disturbance and the hi are constants chosen by the central bank.  The money
multiplier m is
(6)
where B is the log of a regulatory variable constraining bank lending, : is a random disturbance,
and the mi are positive constants.  The interest rate R affects the multiplier through the
opportunity cost of holding excess reserves.
3  An increase in R induces banks to hold less excess
reserves and thus raises m.
The variable B can represent many kinds of constraints; two straightforward possibilities
are a required reserve ratio or a required bank capital ratio.  The precise channel through which B
affects bank lending depends on what B represents, but the net effect is the same and is captured
by (6).  Consider the case where B is a required capital ratio.  A bank’s capital ratio is the ratio of
the bank’s capital (sources of funds obtained from the owners of the bank) to its total assets
(loans plus cash).  Regulators impose on banks a minimum value of the capital ratio.
4  Banks
whose ratios fall below the required ratio are subject to disciplinary action, including being
forced into receivership.  The higher the required bank capital ratio, the less lending a bank can
undertake for any given amount of capital that it has.  To see this, suppose the required capital
ratio is set at its upper limit of one.  The banks then cannot lend any deposited funds; they can
lend only their own capital.  In this case, the banks cease to be banks in the usual sense of the5It is assumed for simplicity that the banks have no sources of funds other than their own
capital and their deposits.  They thus cannot offset the constraining effect of the capital
requirement.  Other sources of funds could be introduced with no substantive change in results as
long as banks could not use them to fully offset the capital ratio’s negative effect on the volume
of bank lending and therefore on the money multiplier.  Furlong (1992) presents evidence that
bank lending in the United States is indeed negatively related to the required capital/asset ratio,
so the simplification of ignoring the existence of non-deposit sources of funds is qualitatively
harmless.
6Note that this discussion implies that (6) is not exact but rather is an approximation.  If
the required capital ratio were set to its maximum possible value of 1, then as just noted the
banks could not lend any of their deposits.  The banks would have no need of free reserves and
so would not hold any.  Also, the shocks ut could not affect the money multiplier, which would
be constant at a value of one.  Consequently, an exact representation of the multiplier would have
m0 and m2 dependent on B and also would have an exponent on ut equal to zero whenever B
equaled 1.  An exact form of this nature is analytically intractable.  For a critical discussion of
bank capital ratios and their impact on bank behavior, see Santomero (1991).
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term because they stop intermediating deposits and loans.
5  Inside money will be zero, and the
money multiplier equals one.  As the required capital ratio is reduced below one, the banks can
and will start lending some fraction of their deposits.  This increase in loans raises the amount of
inside money from zero to a positive amount, and the value of the money multiplier rises above
one.
6  We thus have a negative relation between the money multiplier and the value of the
required bank capital ratio.  Exactly the same analysis applies if B is a required reserve ratio.
We suppose that B is determined by the bank regulatory authority according to the
following regulatory policy function
(7)
where $ is a random disturbance and the bi are constants chosen by the regulator.  This function
is unusual in that it allows the regulatory requirement B to be flexible, responding to the state of
the economy through a feedback rule.  One does not normally think of bank regulations as being7However, before central banks learned to use open market operations to control the
money supply, they did often changed reserve requirements in response to economic or financial
conditions.  The notion of a flexible B thus is not completely novel.
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flexible in this manner because they typically are not.
7  Nothing is lost by using the general
functional form in (7); the standard inflexible requirement is obtained as a special case simply by
setting the coefficient b1 and the disturbance term $ to zero.  However, one of the main results of
the subsequent analysis is that an inflexible B generally is suboptimal.
A random term is included in (7) for two reasons.  First, the regulator responsible for the
day-to-day administration of regulatory policy may not be the sole institution setting regulatory
policy.  In the US, for example, federal regulation of financial institutions is administered by the
Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the Comptroller of the Currency, among others.  The US
Congress, however, can pass laws changing regulations at any time.  In addition, state
governments institute regulations independently of the federal government.  Second, equation (7)
is a simplification of the complicated real world of bank regulation.  Risk-adjusted bank capital
requirements, for example, are fixed numbers.  However, the impact they have on bank lending
depends on the risk structure of the financial assets in existence.  A change in the way risk is
distributed across different borrowers will change the mix of assets banks wish to hold.  The
existing bank capital requirements may be viewed as more or less stringent after the change than
before.  The random term in (7) picks up such effects.  In any case, one always can eliminate the
effects of the random term in (7) simply by setting $ and its variance to zero in all that follows. 
None of the conclusions of the analysis is altered by doing so.
An issue that has been skirted in the foregoing specifications is the role of expected
inflation in determining the demand for money and the money multiplier.  The opportunity cost9
of holding currency is the spread between the real rates of return on the interest-earning asset and
currency, R-RC.  This spread can be written in terms of nominal interest rates:
where r is the nominal interest rate on the interest-earning asset and rC is the nominal interest rate
on currency, which is fixed at zero.  Consequently, both real money demand and the money
multiplier should depend on either both R and B
e, not just R.  Inclusion of B
e is analytically
difficult because it introduces expectations of future values of the system’s variables into the
expressions for the current values.  We therefore will use the expressions for money demand and
the money multiplier given above and treat them as approximations to the true functions.
4. Financial Services.
The financial service F is intimately tied to bank lending.  Banks provide the service only
their own borrowers; if there are no loans, there is no service, either.  The quantity of financial
services F therefore is a function of the quantity of real loans:
(8)
where L is the log of the quantity of real loans, N is a random disturbance, and the fi are positive
constants.  All loans are associated with an equal value of inside money; that is, the quantity of
loans is that part of the money supply that is not high-powered money:10
or, in log terms,
(9)
Unfortunately, this expression is hopelessly nonlinear because it involves the log of a difference. 
We need to linearize (9) to make the subsequent analysis feasible.  Our goal is to study the
optimal relation between bank regulation and monetary policy.  In this regard, (9) has an
important characteristic that permits an easy resolution of our difficulty.  As the required bank
capital ratio B rises, m
~ falls.  The lowest that m
~ can go is 1, at which point the “loan multiplier”
(m
~-1) equals zero and no loans are made.  Thus the loan multiplier reaches zero before the
money multiplier does.  Another way to say this is that the percentage change in loans induced
by a given change in the money multiplier is larger than the percentage change induced in the
money supply.  We therefore can replace the intractable (9) with the tractable approximation
(10)
where k>1.  This formulation captures the property that a given change in the log money
multiplier mt has a larger effect on loans than on money while remaining analytically tractable.
5. Random Disturbances.
Up to now, nothing has been said about the properties of the various random disturbances
appearing in the model.  It is sufficient for our purposes to impose the simplest possible time
series structure on the disturbances, so we assume they are white noise.  Nothing important is
changed by allowing a general ARIMA structure, but the analysis quickly becomes tedious at
best once serial correlation in the disturbances is introduced.  Contemporaneous correlation of
disturbances is permitted throughout the analysis.11
6. Expectations.
We assume rational expectations, so that the expected price level P
e is just the usual
mathematical expectation of the solution of the model’s solution for P:
(11)
where It is the information set at time t.
III. Solution of the Model
Equations (1)-(8), (10), and (11) constitute the model.  The model is conceptually simple
and, having only linear equations,  mathematically trivial.  In this section, we derive the model’s
solution and then examine a graphical interpretation.
1. Mathematical Solution.
Solution begins by substituting (5), (6), (7), (8), and (10) into (2) and (4).  Then (3) and






Notice that aggregate supply Y
S depends not only on P-P
e but also on P independently.  The term
P-P
e represents the usual influence of expectation errors in a rational expectations model.  The
independent term P reflects the influence of the financial service F in (2) and the dependence of F
on real loans.  A change in P, given the money multiplier mt and high powered money Ht,
changes real loans, thus also changing F and Y
S.  This independent influence of P on Y
S is the
source of several interesting conclusions derived below.
We use the semi-reduced forms for Y
D and Y
S to solve for P in terms of P
e, obtaining:
(15)
We then find the solution for P
e by taking the expectation of (15), which gives
(16)
Substituting this expression back into (15) gives the reduced form solution for P:13
(17)
The expected supply of output is the mathematical expectation of (13):
(18)
The first line of (18) shows that expected real output depends on the expected price level, a
nominal variable.  This is a striking result, quite unlike the usual rational expectations solution in
which expected nominal variables have no effects on real variables.  It reflects the previously
noted influence of the financial service on aggregate supply.  The intuition is that, for any given
amount of high powered money H and money multiplier m, an increase in the price level reduces
there real quantity of loans, which also reduces the quantity of financial services.  Note that in
this argument, the value of H was held fixed.  Changes in the price level brought about by
changes in H just cancel, leaving both L and F unaffected; see equation (10).  As we will see
below, when we expand the Xi parameters in the second line of (18), some of the determinants of
P
e drop out.  In particular, the only policy parameters that will remain are b0 and b1 from the
regulatory policy rule (7); the two parameters h0 and h1 from the monetary policy rule (5)
disappear, so that the standard expectational neutrality of money holds.
Finally, the fully-reduced form solution for current output is14
(19)
This expression is not quite as horrendous as it seems.  The first term on the right side is the
expected (“natural rate of”) output; all the other terms are disturbance terms multiplied by
coefficients and represent temporary deviations from the expected level.
2. Graphical Interpretation.
We can depict the model in an IS-LM framework augmented to include aggregate supply
and rational expectations (see Branson, 1989).  The IS equation is simply equation (1) with
current Y replacing Y
D.  The LM equation is obtained by equating money demand and supply - 
equations (3) and (4) - and using (5), (6), and (7) to eliminate Ht, mt, and Bt, which gives
(20)15
The terms after the first two constitute the intercept, which consists of a constant and a linear
combination of some of the disturbances.  Finally, there is a third equation representing the
output supply side of the economy; we can call it the SS equation (for Supply Side).  It is
obtained by using (8), (10), (5), (6), and (7) to eliminate Ft and then Lt, Ht, mt, and Bt from (2),
which gives
(21)
Figure 1 shows the IS, LM, and SS curves.  The graph shows a situation of general
equilibrium, with the three curves intersecting at a common point.  Figure 1 differs from the
standard augmented model in that the SS curve is positively sloped rather than vertical, reflecting
the effect of the interest rate on the quantity of the financial service F, which in turn affects
output.  Also notice that the intercepts of the LM and SS curves depend on the policy parameters
b0 and h0, and the slopes depend on b1, and h1.  The policy reaction parameters b1 and h1 can have
either sign and any magnitude, so in general the slopes of the LM and SS curves can be either
positive or negative.  If b1 and h1 are small, the slopes are positive, and the curves have been
drawn that way in Figure 1.  The dependence of slopes and intercepts on the policy parameters is
what underlies the optimal choice of those parameters, as we see shortly.  Figures 2 and 3 show
two experiments that illustrate the workings of the model and that also will help understand the
subsequent discussion of optimal policy parameter choice.
Consider first an unexpected decrease in the demand for money (that is, a negative16
realization of ").  The behavior of the economy is shown in Figure 2.  The shock to " has no
effect on either IS or SS but does move the LM curve rightward from its initial position LM0 to
LM1, thus disturbing general equilibrium.  To restore equilibrium, the economy raises the price
level P, which moves the LM curve back to the left.  If price perceptions were always correct, so
that P
e changed one-to-one with P, and if financial services had no effect on output supply (that
is, if s2 were zero), then P would rise until the LM curve had returned to its original position. 
The economy would be back at its original equilibrium in real terms, with only nominal effects
of the money shock.  However, two forces alter this conclusion.  First, price perceptions are not
always correct.  In particular, for the usual rational expectations reasons, P
e lags behind P, so that
(P - P
e) in this case becomes positive.  This perceptual error shifts the SS curve right.  Second,
the increase in P reduces the quantity of real loans L, which reduces the quantity of financial
services F, which in turn reduces output supply.  This effect shifts the SS curve left.  The net
shift in SS is unclear and depends on parameter magnitudes.  Figure 2 shows the case where the
perceptual error dominates.  SS shifts right from SS0 to SS2, meeting the LM curve at LM2. 
There is a temporary equilibrium at E2.  As time passes, P
e begins to catch up to P, shifting SS
back to the left, which then requires further increases in P to shift the LM curve farther leftward. 
If financial services were absent from the aggregate supply equation (s2 = 0), then this process
would continue until both SS and LM had returned to their original positions and the economy
was back in full equilibrium at E0.  Ultimately, the money demand shock would have only
nominal effects.  This conclusion is consistent with the analysis presented in Branson (1989). 
When financial services affect output supply, a different conclusion emerges.  It is still true that
P
e equals P once the economy has reached general equilibrium, and the perceptual error has
disappeared.  However, the higher value of P means that F is lower than before the money8Money demand shocks thus are not neutral in the long run.  Shocks to high powered
money (non-zero realizations of 0) are neutral in the long run, however.  The coefficient of 0 in
the SS equation has the same magnitude and opposite sign as the coefficient of P.  Ultimately, P
responds one-to-one to 0, so the effects of 0 on aggregate supply exactly cancel.  The model
thus displays long run neutrality of money.
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demand shock, so the value of aggregate supply also is lower in the new equilibrium than in the
initial one.  The LM and SS curves end up at LM3 and SS3, with the final equilibrium is point E3.
8
Consider next an unexpected decrease in aggregate demand (that is, a negative realization
of *), shown in Figure 3 as a shift from IS0 to IS1.  The economy’s response is similar in
character to that in the previous case.  The price level in this case must fall to shift the LM curve
rightward and restore equilibrium.  As P falls, P
e lags behind, causing a perceptual error and thus
shifting SS leftward.  The fall in P also raises F.  Again assuming that the perceptual error
dominates, a temporary equilibrium occurs at point E1.  As P
e catches up to P, the perceptual
error closes, and SS moves back to the right.  Eventually the economy reaches its full
equilibrium at point E3.  In this case, the shock has a permanent effect on output, but it is unclear
whether output ends up higher or lower than its initial value.  On the one hand, the lower interest
rate in the new general equilibrium is associated with a lower level of the financial service F; on
the other hand, the lower price level is associated with a higher level of F.  Figure 3 has been
drawn under the assumption that the interest rate effect dominates, leaving output lower than
before the shock.
The foregoing examples were chosen for illustrative purposes because of their simplicity. 
Nonetheless, they do lead to an important conclusion: the behavior of the financial sector affects
the real economy in both the short and long run.  Other kinds of shocks show the importance of
the financial sector even more clearly.  In particular, notice that both : (money multiplier shock)9The rest of the analysis of such shocks follows the same steps as those of Figures 2 and 3
and is left to the reader.
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and N (financial services shock) enter the SS equation, so that these purely financial shocks have
direct effects on aggregate output supply.  In terms of the IS-LM-SS graph, : and N shift the SS
curve as well as the LM curve.
9  These direct effects, as well as the indirect effects of the
previous two examples, are quite unlike anything seen in traditional macroeconomic analysis
(save for the work of Bernanke, 1981, 1983, and Bernanke and Gertler, 1989, 1990).  They
reflect the effects of a financial sector that provides real services; they are the reason that the
behavior of the financial sector is important for real economic activity.
Finally, as already mentioned, the slopes and intercepts of the LM and SS curves depend
on the regulatory and monetary policy parameters b0, b1, h0, and h1.  These parameters are at the
disposal of the authorities and can be used to offset or at least reduce the impact of shocks to the
economy.  For example, the money demand shock analyzed in Figure 2 can be offset by an
appropriate change in h0.  Also notice that the long-run effect of the money demand shock on real
output can be altered by changing the slope of the SS curve through changes in b1 and h1.  We
now turn to an analysis of the optimal choice of the four policy parameters.
IV. Optimal Policy
We suppose that the policy maker has two objectives: to maximize the expected value
(the “natural rate”) of real output and to minimize the variance of current output around its
expected value.  In the usual analysis of optimal monetary policy choice under uncertainty, all
interest centers on minimizing the variance of real output.  No attention is paid to the level of
output because monetary policy does not affect expected output EY in standard rational19
expectations models.  In the present model, however, bank regulatory policy affects EY, so we
need to include EY in the objective function.  The formal objective function is discussed
momentarily.
Policy makers would have no difficulty designing optimal policy if they could know the
current state of the economy.  They would observe the shifts in the IS, LM, and SS curves and
would change their policy parameters (b0, b1, h0, and h1 in this case) to eliminate the temporary
deviations from full equilibrium that we saw in Figures 2 and 3.  Unfortunately, policy makers
cannot know the current state of the economy because of data limitations and so are forced to
base their policy decisions instead on various indicator variables.  To keep the present discussion
simple, we will suppose that the only indicator variable available to policy makers is the interest
rate.  The two examples discussed at the end of the previous section illustrate the problem that
policy makers face.  In the example of Figure 2, a shock to money demand causes (1) a short-run
decrease in R and increase in Y and (2) a long-run increase in R and decrease in Y.  In the
example of Figure 3, a shock to commodity demand also causes a short-run decrease in R but a
concurrent decrease rather than increase in Y; in the long run, R decreases even more, and output
rises, possibly ending up above its pre-shock value (but drawn in Figure 3 as ultimately lower
than the pre-shock value).  A policy maker who wants to use policy to stabilize real output will
find himself in a quandary because a given observed movement in the interest rate - the only
information he has on the current state of the economy - can correspond to a positive or negative
shock to output about its expected value and to a positive or negative change in the expected
value itself.  The policy maker thus will have difficulty deciding which way to move his policy10In fact, the information problem is even more difficult for the policy maker because the
economy also can experience shocks to the aggregate supply function, causing shifts in the SS
curve with commensurate changes in the interest rate.  Such shifts are included in the formal
analysis below, though not shown in Figures 2 or 3.
11Readers familiar with Poole’s (1970) analysis will recognize the similarities between his
work and the analysis presented here.
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parameters and how far to move them.
10  The analysis that follows derives the optimal policy
prescription.
Before we proceed to the formal analysis, we can see immediately something of the
general character of the answer.  Optimal choice of the four policy parameters will depend on
two sets of parameters in the model: (1) the variances and covariances of all disturbance terms,
and (2) the slope and intercept terms of the various demand and supply functions.  The variances
and covariances matter because they determine the probabilities that an observed change in the
interested rate is caused by shifts in each of the IS, LM, and SS curves.  The policy maker needs
to know which curve is shifting to respond appropriately.  The slopes and intercepts matter
because they determine the impact that any policy response will have on output and therefore
determine how big the policy response should be.  (For example, if the LM curve were flat, then
the money demand shock shown in Figure 2 would have no effect on the economy because the
LM curve would simply shift rightward on top of itself.)  The four policy parameters cause
movements and tilts in the LM and SS curves; the effect on output of moving either of these
curves depends on the initial positions and slopes of all three curves.
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We now proceed to a formal derivation of the optimal choice of the model’s four policy
parameters, b0, b1, h0, and h1.21
1. Optimality Criterion.
Optimality is defined as the maximization of a social welfare function V that depends on
both the expected level of output EY and the variance VarY of output about EY.  The function is
(22)
We have no intuition for the signs of the cross-derivative V12 = V21.  They play no role in what
follows, so we leave them unspecified.
The reader will notice the absence from the welfare function of that standard goal
variable of the banking literature, “banking system stability.”  The policy maker’s goal is to
maximize social welfare; banking system stability is in itself no more relevant to that goal than,
say, cheese shop stability.  Banking system stability does enter the welfare function indirectly, in
a sense, because the banking system affects the economy in two important ways that other
specific industries (including cheese shops) do not.  The first is the classic monetary transmission
mechanism.  Inside money is created by bank lending, so disruptions to the banking system also
disrupt the money supply.  The second is the intermediary service, which affects the efficiency of
production.  Banking system instability causes instability in both the money supply and the
intermediary service and therefore also cause instability in output.  The money multiplier in the
model captures the effect of the banking system on the money supply; the financial service
variable F captures the intermediary service.  Nonetheless, one must keep in mind that
minimization of banking system stability in itself is not an objective of optimal policy and so is
not an end in itself.  It is relevant only to the extent that it leads to the optimal mix of expected22
output and variance of output.  Indeed, as we now see, in a maximizing environment with policy
trade-offs, it is as conceivable that there is not enough banking system instability as that there is
too little.
Bank regulation affects the ability of both channels to transmit any instability in the
banking system to real output.  In the model, “banking system instability” would be interpreted
as the variance of the random term : in the money multiplier equation (6).  That term captures
various effects, including changes in the public’s desired currency/deposit ratio (which can
change dramatically as part of a bank panic) and failure of banks (such as through bankruptcy,
perhaps in response to a bank panic).  Increasing the required bank regulation variable B reduces
the transmission of any variability in : to aggregate output.  To see this, recall that all equations
in the model are in log form.  Thus the money multiplier is the antilog of mt:
The variance of m
~ involves the product of the variance of the random term :
~ and the square of
the term (1+B)
-m
1.  A higher value of B thus reduces the variance of m
~.  It then is clear from (2),
(4), and (8) that the variances of aggregate output, the money supply, and the financial service all
are reduced as well.  Thus increasing the bank regulatory requirement reduces the variances of
the variables of interest.
Finally, note that increasing the bank regulatory requirement not only reduces the
variances of important variables but also reduces their expected levels.  In particular, a higher
value of B means a lower value of expected output EY, as is easily seen by taking the expected
values of (6), (8), and (10) and substituting into the expected value of (2).  We thus have the
basis for a classic optimization problem: on the one hand, raising B is good because it reduces23
variance of output, but on the other hand it is bad because it reduces expected output.  We now
turn our attention to solving that optimization problem.
2. The Effects of the Policy Parameters on EY and Y.
It is convenient to consolidate the effects of the policy parameters in the expressions for
EY and Y.  We begin by rearranging the terms in expressions for the Xi variables, defined in
(14), to obtain the following:
(23)
where the Ui are functions of the structural parameters excluding the four policy parameters and
are defined in Table 1.  We can substitute these expressions for the Xi into (18) and (19) and
rearrange terms to get (after an enormous amount of tedious algebra)
(24)24
(25)
where the qi are the elements of the 10-fold vector







the Z coefficients, defined in Table 1, depend on the system parameters other than the four policy
parameters, and the K
j are functions of b1 and h1 defined as the ratios of the sums in the first line
of (25).  We can make (25) more compact by defining the vector S of random terms:
St / ("t, $t, *t, 0t, :t, Nt, 2t )
so that we can write (25) as
(26)
We then can write the variance of current output as25
(27)
There are some interesting things to notice here.  Both expected income EY and current
income Y depend on the bank regulation policy parameters b0 and b1.  Bank regulation affects the
amount of loans made for any given stock of high powered money and so also affects the amount
of the financial service offered by banks.  The financial service has real effects and so affects
both EY and Y.  In contrast, monetary policy has much more limited impact.  EY does not
depend on either h0 or h1; money is expectationally neutral.  Current income Y also is
independent of h0, but it does depend on h1.  Independence from h0 is another manifestation of
expectational neutrality; h0 is the mean of high powered money and affects no real variables. 
Dependence of Y on h1 reflects the ability of monetary policy to amplify or reduce random
disturbances through the reaction function and is typical of rational expectations models such as
that used here (Walsh, 1998; Woglom, 1979).
3. Optimal Regulatory and Monetary Policy.





The signs of the derivatives of the functions J
i generally are ambiguous, depending on the
magnitudes of all the structural parameters of the system.  The parameter h0 does not affect
anything, so its first order condition (30) is identically zero irrespective of the value chosen it. 
Choice of h0 is arbitrary, and we may ignore equation (30) hereafter.  The other three policy27
parameters are chosen to satisfy the system consisting of (28), (29), and (31).  In general, the
three relevant policy parameters b0, b1, and h1 must be determined simultaneously.  This may
seem a little surprising, given that b0 does not directly affect the variance of income VarY and h1
does not directly affect the expected level of output EY.  Indeed, b0 is absent from the first order
condition (31) for h1, and h1 is absent from the condition (28) for b0.  However, b1 enters both
conditions and so ties b0 and h1 together.  Choice of b0 affects choice of b1; choice of b1 affects
choice of h1; and conversely.
The system (28), (29), and (31) is highly non-linear in the three policy parameters, so an
explicit solution is impossible to provide.  Nonetheless, we can deduce several important
conclusions quite quickly.
3.1. Output effects of monetary policy.
Standard rational expectations models obtain the result that monetary policy affects only
the variance of current output but not the level of expected real output.  Once we introduce
financial services and regulation of the banking system, we get quite a different result.  In such a
setting, monetary policy does affect the level of expected real output.  The effect is indirect, but it
is there.  Bank regulatory requirements alter the amount of financial service provided by the
banking system and thus affect expected output directly.  However, the optimal values for the
bank regulation parameters depend on the value of the monetary policy reaction parameter h1, so
the choice of h1 affects the choice of b0 and b1 and thereby affects not only VarY but also EY.
3.2. The level of regulatory policy.
Although the monetary policy intercept parameter h0 is not relevant to anything of interest
here, the regulation policy intercept parameter b0 is.  The mean level of the bank regulatory
variable B is b0+b1ER, which depends not only on the reaction parameter b1 but also on the12Of course, it may be not be realistic to suppose that most private agents have same
information about the economy that the central bank has.  Indeed, some information available to
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intercept parameter b0.  The value of b0 affects the amount of lending for any given quantity of
high powered money and thus also affects the amount of the financial service F supplied by the
banking system; that in turn affects aggregate output.
3.3. Active bank regulatory policy.
A very interesting result is that the optimal bank regulation reaction parameter b1
generally is not zero.  Both the sign and magnitude of b1 depend on all the non-policy parameters
of the system: the intercept and slope coefficients from the demand and supply equations for both
money and output and the variances and covariances of all the random disturbances in the
economy.  These system parameters are impounded in the J
i functions in (28), (29), and (31). 
This result mirrors the well-known conclusion from the literature on optimal monetary policy,
where it is shown that the monetary policy reaction parameter generally is not zero and depends
on all the parameters of the system (Poole, 1970; Walsh, 1998; and Woglom, 1979).  As in that
literature, the parameter h1 generally is not zero.
An important implication is that bank regulation should not be a passive activity, in
which the bank regulatory requirements are set once (or once in a great while) and then left
unchanged.  Rather, the requirements should change in response to the shocks hitting the
economy.
As in all models of this type, the effectiveness of monetary policy hinges on the monetary
authority having an information advantage over private agents.  If the private sector knows
everything the central bank knows, it can achieve everything that reactive monetary policy can
simply by adjusting the price level.
12  The same conclusion is not true of bank regulation. the central bank is likely to be proprietary information that must be kept secret.  This certainly is
the case with the US central bank, which has access to a great deal of detailed information on
individual private banks.  In addition, it seems safe to say the average household knows much
less than the central bank about the economy’s structure and workings; this sort of information
advantage, however, is very difficult to capture in a formal rational expectations model in which
all agents know the true structure of the economy.
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Because both b0 and b1 directly affect the quantity of financial service F provided to the
economy, they have real effects even if all agents in the economy have the same information as
the regulators.  We can see this in Figure 1, in which the slope of the SS function is not vertical,
as it is in the usual treatment (Branson, 1989), but rather is positive, reflecting the effect of the
financial service F.  The quantity of F is determined in part by the values of b0 and b1.
3.4. Institutional arrangements for optimal policy coordination.
The simultaneity of optimal policy parameter choice in the model means that regulation
of bank capital and conduct of monetary policy should be coordinated.  Neither can be done
properly without reference to the other.  The requisite coordination is all the more demanding
because, as just noted, bank capital regulation should be active rather than passive.  Both the
level of the bank regulatory requirement and the quantity of money should be adjusted
continually in response to changing economic conditions, and the adjustments need to be
coordinated with each other.  The need for coordination arises from two separate sources in the
model.  First, random disturbances in the banking and monetary sectors may be correlated.  It is
quite plausible, for example, that the disturbance N to the supply of financial services is
correlated with the disturbance : to the money multiplier.  Second, even if the disturbance
covariances are all zero, the optimal policy parameters are still related to each other through the
structure of the economy.  In general, each policy parameter depends on all the coefficients and
variances of the system, so each policy parameter’s optimal value is influenced by all sectors of30
the economy.  Conversely, this fact implies that bank regulatory policy both can be used to
counteract disturbances in both the real and monetary sectors of the economy; indeed, the formal
solution shows that the two sets of policy parameters must be varied simultaneously to achieve
an optimal response to any given disturbance to the system.
These conclusions argue for a close link between the monetary and regulatory authorities. 
The obvious way to provide that link is to give responsibility for both types of policy to a single
government agency.  Indeed, the whole spirit of the foregoing analysis implies this arrangement. 
Choosing both the monetary and regulatory policy parameters by maximization of a single social
welfare function amounts to having a central planner make all policy, and what is a central
planner but a single agency?
Other considerations of the real world not included in the analysis here may call for
modification of this conclusion.  For example, Di Noia and Di Giorgio (1999) present evidence
that countries where banking supervision is assigned monopolistically to the central bank are
characterized on average by more protected and less efficient banking systems.  Why this is true
is unclear.  Perhaps it is just another manifestation of the tendency for regulated industries to end
up dominating the agencies that regulate them; it may be that powerful banks get their
governments to assign supervision of themselves to a single agency that they then end up
controlling one way or another.  In any case, monopoly control may be as inefficient and
unimaginative in the regulatory sphere as it is in the productive one.  If so, there is then a tension
between the theoretical ideal of a single unified monetary and regulatory agency suggested by the
results presented above and the political reality that monopoly agencies are inefficient.
A concern sometimes suggested in the literature is that bank regulators and the central
bank have different objectives, so that assigning regulation to the central bank could pervert13For example, Choi (2000) argues that strengthening of capital adequacy requirements
were an important contributor to the recent sharp recession in Korea.
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regulation if the central bank were to give too much weight to monetary policy considerations in
deciding what the regulations should be.  The analysis presented here suggests quite the opposite. 
With one agency responsible for both regulation and monetary policy, that agency then acts as a
social planner and gives correct weight to all considerations.  Indeed, if improper weights are
ever likely to be given to parameter choices, it would seem to be when the two functions are
assigned to separate institutions that may well have different, parochial objective functions.
V. Conclusions
On a theoretical level, perhaps the most surprising conclusion of the foregoing analysis is
that monetary policy can affect the expected level of real output even in a rational expectations
model.  This effect arises from the cross-effects of bank regulation and monetary policy on each
other.  Bank regulation affects the money supply, so it ends up being chosen simultaneously with
and therefore influenced by monetary policy.  However, bank regulation directly affects output,
so monetary policy affects output indirectly.  Optimal choice of monetary policy takes this
indirect effect into consideration.
On a practical level, the most important conclusions concern the conduct of regulatory
policy and the implied institutional arrangements for carrying it out.  Bank regulation should be
active rather than passive, continually changing in response to economic conditions.  This is an
important conclusion.  There is no question that financial regulation can have powerful effects on
aggregate economic activity.
13  To my knowledge, however, systematic activism has not
characterized bank regulatory policy in any country, although there is some evidence of14Berger, Kyle, and Scalise (2000) present evidence that U. S. bank regulators were
stricter during the credit crunch period of 1989-92 than subsequently.  The last recession in the
U.S. occurred during 1989-92; after that, the U.S. economy enjoyed a major boom.  Even if this
behavior was part of a larger systematic relation between regulation and economic conditions,
the direction of causality is unclear.  If economic conditions drove regulatory behavior, the
optimality of the latter cannot be known until the implied reaction function is compared with that
suggested by the foregoing theory.
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occasional episodes in which regulations were conditioned on economic conditions.
14  No less
important is the conclusion that optimal regulatory and monetary policy should be
simultaneously chosen, implying that the institutions responsible for them must at least
coordinate their activities and perhaps even should be combined into one agency.
The analysis here has looked at only one aspect of bank regulation, the choice of the
optimal level of the regulatory requirement.  There are other important aspects.  With respect to
regulation of bank capital, for example, there is concern with the proper valuation and control of
the riskiness of various types of capital that go into the capital ratio.  Santomero and Seater
(2000) suggest that controlling riskiness involves a trade-off between the stability gains from
such control on the one hand and the associated reduction in aggregate output on the other hand. 
In other words, control of capital riskiness will have to be evaluated in the context of a
macroeconomic model that properly accounts for the effects that regulation has on aggregate
economic activity.  In that case, the optimal control of bank portfolio riskiness will have to be
determined simultaneously with the optimal choice of the level of the capital ratio as analyzed
above.  Similar issues may arise with other types of bank regulation.33
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Table 1
Definitions of Composite Parameters in Equations (23), (24), and (25)
U0 a0 + a1d0 - m0
U1 -1
U2 m1





U8 s0 + s2f0 + s2f1km0
W1 [s1 - s2f1(k-1)]m2 + (s1 + s2f1)(a1d1 + a2) - d1
W2 s1
W3 [- s1 + s2f1(k-1)]m1
W4 [s2f1(k-1) + s1]m2 + (s1 - s2f1)(a1d1 + a2)
W5 [- s2f1(k-1) - s1]m1
W6 - s2f1(k-1)m2 + s2f1(a1d1 + a2)
W7 s2f1(k-1)m1
W8 s2f1k(a1d1 + a2)
W9 s2f1(k-1)
W10 2s1(m2 + a1d1 + a2) -d1
W11 2s1
W12 -2s1m1
W13 a1s2f1km2 - m2 - a1d1 - a 2
W14 a1s2f1 - 1
W15 - a1s2f1km1 + m136
ZEY0 - d1s0 - d1s2f0 + s2f1d0(a1d1 + a2) - d1s2f1(a0 + a1d0) - d1s2f1(k-1)m0 - s2f1d0(k-1)m2
ZEY1 d1s2f1(k-1)m1
ZEY2 s2f1d0(k-1)m1
ZD0 s2f1(a1d1 + a2) + s2f1(k-1)m2 - d1
ZD1 s2f1(k-1)m1
ZEP0 (m2 + a1d1 + a2)(s0 + s2f0 + s2f1km0) + (a0 + a1d0 - m0)s2f1km2 - (m2 + a1d1 + a2)d0 +
d1(a0 + a1d0 - m0)
ZEP1 (m2 + a1d1 + a2)s2f1 - d1
ZEP2 (s0 + s2f0 + s2f1km0) + (a0 + a1d0 - m0)s2f1 - s2f1km2 - d0
ZEP3 (m2 + a1d1 + a2)(- s2f1km1) + m1 + d1s2f1km2 + d1m1







ZYD0 (s1 + s2f1)(m2 + a1d1 + a2)
2 - s2f1 (m2 + a1d1 + a2)km2 - d1 (m2 + a1d1 + a2)
ZYD1 2s1 (m2 + a1d1 + a2) + s2f1 (m2 + a1d1 + a2) - s2f1km2 - d1
ZYD2 - 2(s1 + s2f1)(m2 + a1d1 + a2)m1 + s2f1 (m2 + a1d1 + a2)km1 - s2f1km1m2 + d1m1





Z"Y0 W10W1U5 + d1W4
Z"Y1 W10W1U6 + W11W1U5 + W10W2U5 + d1W2
Z"Y2 W10W1U7 + W12W1U5 + W10W3U5 + d1W5
Z"Y3 W11W1U7 + W12W1U6 + W10W2U7 + W12W2U5 + W10W3U6 + W11W3U5
Z"Y4 W11W1U6 + W10W2U6 + W11W2U5
Z"Y5 W12W1U7 + W10W3U7 + W12W3U5
Z"Y6 W11W2U7 + W12W2U6 + W11W3U6
Z"Y7 W12W2U7 + W11W3U7 + W12W3U6
Z"Y8 W11W2U6
Z"Y9 W12W3U7
Z$Y0 m1(- W10W1W8 + d1W4)
Z$Y1 m1(- W10W1W9 - W11W1W8 - W10W2W8 + d1W2)
Z$Y2 m1(- W12W1W8 - W10W3W8 + d1W5)
Z$Y3 m1(- W12W1W9 - W12W2W8 - W10W3W9 - W11W3W8)
Z$Y4 m1(- W11W1W9 - W10W2W9 - W11W2W8)
Z$Y5 m1(- W12W3W8)




Z*Y0 W10W1W13 + d1a1W4
Z*Y1 W10W1W14 + W11W1W13 + W10W2W13 + c1a1W2
Z*Y2 W10W1W15 + W12W1W13 + W10W3W13 + d1a1W5
Z*Y3 W11W1W15 + W12W1W14 + W10W2W15 + W12W2W13 + W11W3W1338
Z*Y4 W11W1W14 + W10W2W14 + W11W2W13
Z*Y5 W12W1W15 + W10W3W15 + W12W3W13
Z*Y6 W11W2W15 + W12W2W14 + W11W3W14
Z*Y7 W12W2W15 + W11W3W15 + W12W3W14
Z*Y8 W11W2W14
Z*Y9 W12W3W15
Z0Y0 W10W1W6 - d1W4
Z0Y1 W11W1W6 + W10W2W6 - d1W2
Z0Y2 W10W1W7 + W12W1W6 + W10W3W6 - d1W5
Z0Y3 W11W1W7 + W10W2W7 + W12W2W6 + W11W3W6
Z0Y4 W11W2W6
Z0Y5 W12W1W7 + W10W3W7 + W12W3W6
Z0Y6 W11W2W7
Z0Y7 W11W2W7 + W11W3W7
Z0Y8 0
Z0Y9 W12W3W7
Z:Y0 W10W1W8 - d1W4
Z:Y1 W10W1W9 + W11W1W8 + W10W2W8 - d1W2
Z:Y2 W12W1W8 + W10W3W8 - d1W5
Z:Y3 W12W1W9 + W12W2W8 + W10W3W9 + W11W3W8
Z:Y4 W11W1W8 + W10W2W9 + W11W2W8
Z:Y5 W12W3W8










Figure 1: IS-LM-SS Figure 2: Negative shock to money demand
Figure 3: Negative shock to output demand